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Ten years since the nationwide J14 housing protests against Israel’s increasing cost of living, 
affordable housing remains just as scarce, even prompting some city-dwellers to seek cheaper 
living in West Bank settlements – a military-occupied Palestinian Territory. Given that Israel is 
often called the Start-Up Nation, Airbnb’s rise in Tel Aviv-Yaffo and West Bank settlements 
was exceptional. Thus, my thesis aims to determine Airbnb’s role in the Tel Aviv-Yaffo housing 
crisis and the West Bank settlement economy. My research demonstrates the ways in which 
Airbnb accelerates the existing historic trends in Tel Aviv-Yaffo and the West Bank by 
introducing new capital flows via the sharing platforms.  
While existing Israeli literature on Airbnb’s activity in Tel Aviv-Yaffo has done an 
adequate job of addressing the phenomenon as a policy and legal issue, none have understood it 
within Israel-Palestine’s gentrification-colonization matrix. My contribution is applying Anglo 
gentrification literature to consider how these activities unfold in particular ways within Israel-
Palestine’s unique colonial context. Through a post-colonial lens, my thesis reveals how Airbnb 
has exacerbated the housing crisis by converting residential units into illegal hotels, displaced 
marginalized Jews in south Tel Aviv-Yaffo, turned human rights violations into tourist 
attractions, and further displaced Palestinian Arabs living both within and outside the Green 
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In the past few years, the sharing economy has gained major traction for its potential to 
broaden the scope of self-employment opportunities, build a sense of community, create 
environmental sustainability, lower the costs of services, and foster sustainable consumption. 
These qualities are precisely what have made the sharing economy appeal to the Israeli-
Palestinian market, as the availability of land and ethnic-divisions has long been a socio-
economic obstacle, especially now when the nation is facing a housing shortage.1 In light of this, 
my master’s research asks the following question: What role does Airbnb play in Tel Aviv-
Yaffo’s housing crisis and the West Bank settlement economy? 
Israel has a lot of potential as an important case study for the sharing economy. While 
many countries face these issues today, Israel is at a critical juncture with its housing market. Not 
much has changed since the 2011 cost of living protests, especially in Tel Aviv-Yaffo. Almost a 
decade after the nation-wide demonstrations occurred, a 2021 issue of The Economist listed Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo as the fifth most expensive city in the world in cost of living – “ahead of New York 
City and Geneva.”2   
As importantly, the housing crisis and gentrification in Israel unfolded within the context 
of colonization and settlement-building. Not only does the gentrification and the high-cost of 
living within the Green Line lead Jewish Israeli citizens to opt for living in the settlements, but 
then some of these settlements become Airbnbs.3 The sharing economy presents itself as a new 
 
1 David Horovitz, “A Deeper Political Agenda behind Israel’s Soaring Housing Market?,” The Times of Israel, 
August 23, 2016, https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-deeper-political-agenda-behind-israels-soaring-housing-market/; 
Sue Surkes, “Investors Bailing out of New Properties Market,” The Times of Israel, March 13, 2017, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/investors-bailing-out-of-new-properties-market-report/. 
2 Alexandra Vardi, “A Decade After Social Protests, Affordable Housing Remains A Dream For Many,” The Times 
of Israel, February 18, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-decade-after-social-protests-affordable-housing-
remains-a-dream-for-many/. 
3 “The Green Line or the pre-1967 border or 1949 Armistice border, is the demarcation line set out in the 1949 




way of understanding colonialism, as West Bank settlers list their homes on Airbnb, displace 
indigenous Palestinians, and financially profit from their displacement via the sharing platforms. 
In turn, settler-run Airbnbs in Palestine have led to the normalization of the Occupation. 
According to anthropologist, Rebecca Stein: 
In the last few years, by extension, the Israeli demand for leisure opportunities in Jewish 
settlements in the Palestinian West Bank has grown markedly. Settler entrepreneurs and 
families seeking extra income increasingly court both Israeli and international tourists 
with the promise of serene landscapes, wine tasting, and spacious accommodations at 
reduced prices. 4 
 
This phenomenon provides new understandings of land conflicts and displacement found at the 
intersections of tourism, colonialism, and gentrification.  
The sharing economy has had a real rise in many nations with high tech-sectors, such as 
Canada, the United States, and Germany.5 It is best defined as an economy that uses a range of 
“platforms” which link peer-providers to peer-consumers (e.g. Airbnb and WeWork) and allow 
people to consume under-utilized resources collaboratively.6 Technology plays a major role in 
this economic model, as the very existence of the shared economy is completely reliant on 
sharing-based technology, platforms, communities, creation, sales, purchases, and ownership. 
Israel, known in the business and tech world as “the Start-Up Nation”, is a potential major player 
 
after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. It served as the de facto borders of the State of Israel from 1949 until the Six-Day 
War in 1967”; Amnon Sella, “Custodians and Redeemers: Israeli Leaders’ Perceptions of Peace, 1967-79,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 22, no. 2 (1986): 236–51. 
4 Rebecca L. Stein, “#StolenHomes: Israeli Tourism and/as Military Occupation in Historical Perspective,” 
American Quarterly 68, no. 3 (2016): 545. 
5 Sarah Cannon and Lawrence H. Summers, “How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can Win Over Regulators,” 
Harvard Business Review, October 13, 2014, sec. Technology; Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sjöklint, and Antti Ukkonen, 
“The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collabourative Consumption,” Journal of the Association for 
Information Science and Technology 67, no. 9 (2016): 2047–59; Mohammad Reza Habibi, Alexander Davidson, and 
Michel Laroche, “What Managers Should Know about the Sharing Economy,” Business Horizons 60, no. 1 (January 
2017): 113–21; Chris Richter et al., “Digital Entrepreneurship: Innovative Business Models for the Sharing 
Economy,” Creativity and Innovation Management 26, no. 3 (2017): 300–310. 
6 Meisam Ranjbari, Gustavo Morales-Alonso, and Ruth Carrasco-Gallego, “Conceptualizing the Sharing Economy 
through Presenting a Comprehensive Framework,” Sustainability 10, no. 7 (July 2018): 2336; Sunyoung Cho, 
ChongWoo Park, and Junghwan Kim, “Leveraging Consumption Intention with Identity Information on Sharing 




in the sharing economy.7 My interest in the Israel-Palestine case is in demonstrating the extent to 
which the sharing economy not only deregulates markets (about which there is a good deal of 
literature already) but that it may also play a role – even if indirect – in in the complex matrix of 
land-based or territorial conflicts. 
My research explores the impact of the sharing economy’s role as an obstacle to 
affordable housing access for residents in Tel Aviv-Yaffo which while indirect may be used to 
trace the expansion of settlements in Palestine. More specifically, my thesis demonstrates that 
Airbnb has led to a rent price increase in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, leading to Netanyahu’s government 
politicizing settlements as affordable housing options, which resulted in an increase in West 
Bank funding – against the wishes of Israeli citizens living within the Green Line. The aim of my 
research is to fit Airbnb’s deregulation of the housing market and displacement of marginalized 
neighbourhoods into the wider dynamics and historic trends of Israel-Palestine (i.e. colonization 
and settlement-building). Existing Israeli literature on Airbnb has adequately explained the ways 
in which Airbnb’s activities have impacted or been a result of deregulation and municipal public 
policy, but I will be applying the American/Anglo Airbnb literature to consider how these 
activities unfolds in particular ways within the colonial context. My thesis draws on existing 
policy-based, scholarly and activist literature to develop my analytical framework.  
Thesis Structure 
Chapter I is divided into three parts, each devoted to explaining Israel’s nation building 
project via housing and the ways in which it has led to the 2011 housing protests. The first part 
 
7 Einat Paz-Frankel, “Israeli Startups Lead Sharing Economy,” NoCamels, June 1, 2016, 
http://nocamels.com/2016/06/israeli-startups-lead-sharing-economy/; Moshe Gilad, “In Tel Aviv, Airbnb May Have 
Revealed Its Darkest Side Yet,” Haaretz, November 21, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium.MAGAZINE-in-tel-aviv-airbnb-may-have-revealed-its-darkest-side-yet-1.5466748; Moath al-






examines how the Israel Land Administration (ILA), an Israeli government authority responsible 
for managing land in Israel that is in the public domain, created segregated Ashkenazi, Mizrahi 
and Palestinian communities through the provision of public housing. The second part explains 
the history of state-funded occupation in the West Bank and the financial incentives for displaced 
Jewish Israeli citizens to move into these settlements. The third part examines how the housing 
prices and the cost of living have been increasing at such an alarming rate that Israel, in 
particular in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, is faced with a housing crisis. The 2011 J14 nation-wide protests 
focused on these issues, however, marginalized groups within the protests also voiced their 
concerns around the state-engineered ghettos they have been forced to live in, the gentrification 
of their neighbourhoods, and the obstacles the state has placed on these groups for buying a new 
home. Netanyahu’s Knesset responded to these cost-of-living demonstrations by creating the 
demanded welfare state – only outside the Green Line. 
Chapter II examines the existing literature on the sharing economy, Airbnb, 
homeownership, gentrification, transnational gentrification and introduces the analytical 
framework for the thesis. Building on stage theory, the rent gap model, and existing Israeli 
studies of sharing platforms, this research is interested in understanding the connection between 
colonization and gentrification through Airbnb’s impact on city-to-settlement migration in Israel-
Palestine. Following urban scholars Sigler and Waschmuth, my thesis looks at Airbnb’s activities 
as a part of a transnational gentrification process “that connects leisure-driven migration to 
spatially distant neighbourhood reinvestment schemes that existing local demand may not have 
allowed for.”8 While Israeli scholars have fittingly examined the lack of regulations and the 
housing shortage in Tel Aviv-Yaffo that have allowed for Airbnb to flourish in the city, none 
 
8 Thomas Sigler and David Wachsmuth, “Transnational Gentrification: Globalisation and Neighbourhood Change in 




have identified the relationship between the gentrification in Tel Aviv-Yaffo to the colonization 
of the West Bank. Thus, I will be applying the American/Anglo Airbnb literature on 
gentrification and colonization to consider how Airbnb activities unfold in particular ways within 
the colonial context. 
Chapter III provides detail on my data collection strategy, the tables listed in the 
Appendices, and my data sources. This section is broken up into two parts: the measurements 
used to calculate the gentrification occurring in Tel Aviv-Yaffo via Airbnb and the 
measurements used to calculate the colonization of the West Bank via Airbnb.  
Chapter IV opens up with a demonstration of the exceptional scope of Airbnb activities in 
Tel Aviv-Yaffo compared to other major cities. Then, this section goes through existing Israeli 
literature on Airbnb to examine why Tel Aviv-Yaffo has been impacted by Airbnb more than 
any other major city in the world and what is driving the Airbnb’ization. The main focus on this 
section is how Airbnb has impacted the housing market in Tel Aviv-Yaffo. First, the lack or 
regulations and the profit potentials have created a new class of landlords – the Airbnb 
entrepreneurs. In Tel Aviv-Yaffo, in particular, the majority of Airbnb hosts have multiple 
listings on the platform, and some have even turned entire building complexes into illegal hotels. 
The conversion of residential rental properties into hotels has decreased the housing supply in the 
city and increased rent prices. The flood of global tourists has shifted the focus of local 
businesses to the tourists as their new customer base and most of the prices in the area have 
increased. In particular, Airbnb presents itself as the affordable option for short-term 
accommodations, so many of the Airbnb listings are in neighbourhoods with cheaper rent; thus, 
Airbnb disproportionally affects marginalized neighbourhoods populated with mostly Mizrahi 




However, the Israel-Palestine is a unique historical context in which the line between 
gentrification and colonization is often blurred. Many of the neighbourhoods being gentrified in 
Israeli urban centres are Palestinian neighbourhoods, which is an obstacle for Israeli and 
Palestinian scholars when seeking to make a distinction between the two processes. However, 
this thesis will allow the distinction between gentrification and colonization to remain in a grey 
area to demonstrate that the processes are highly interlinked in the case of Israel-Palestine.9  
Chapter V demonstrates that some Tel Aviv-Yaffo residents displaced by neoliberal 
municipal policies and Airbnb’s exploitation of their neighbourhoods have increasingly begun 
moving to the West Bank. Then, this section examines the ways in which Airbnb listings in the 
West Bank normalize the occupation through tourism and Netanyahu’s politicization of West 
Bank settlements as the surburbs of Israel, rather than a militarized occupation of Palestine.  
In light of current social struggles over access to housing and social justice in Israel, the 
conclusion summarizes the overarching argument and reflects on the impact the pandemic may 
have on Airbnb’s activities in the region. 
  
 
9 However, the gentrification of Palestinian neighbourhoods in Israel is no less a case of colonization than the 




CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Part I: Nation-Building via Housing 
 Government housing programs and policies were important to Israel’s goal of defining 
itself as a Jewish (yet segregated) homeland. In “Myth of the Benevolent State”, Marcuse 
examines U.S. national housing policies to demonstrate the mechanisms of the state-citizen 
contract as exploitative rather than benevolent.10 He explains that while nation-states claim to be 
benevolent institutions serving their citizens, they use the very basic terms of the social contract 
– like housing – to dominate, rather than care for, their citizens.11 In the case of Israel especially, 
housing policies have always been created to support if also manage the various waves of Jewish 
immigrants and the existing Palestinian population. 
Housing is not only a representation or symbol of the nation. It is equipment, a tool with 
which subjects (i.e. citizens) are formed, values are inscribed, and class struggle, in the broadest 
sense, is waged.12 For a newly formed state such as Israel, housing was not simply built to shelter 
Jewish immigrants, but a means to claim territory. Housing embodies the nation-state’s idea of 
what it means to “be at home” as a member of the imagined community of the nation.13 More 
than any other built form, then, housing and the ways in which it is distributed can serve as a tool 
for questioning the modern nation-state as a cultural-political institution. 
Israel’s political and ideological-cultural foundation is Zionism, the Jewish nationalist 
movement that supports the re-establishment of a Jewish homeland in the territory deemed as the 
historic Land of Israel. Prior to 1948, Zionism was only a reactionary utopia, but after the 
 
10 Peter Marcuse, “The Myth of the Benevolent State: Towards a Theory of Housing,” Social Policy 8, no. 4 (1978): 
21–26. 
11 Marcuse. 
12 Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment (Princeton University Press, 2003); Aihwa 
Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Duke University Press, 1999). 





Holocaust, it gained immense traction as there began mass immigration of Jews to this “safe” 
state. The interrelation of the national home and the individual house is central to Zionism as 
ideology and as a regime. In her book “Building a Homeland”, architect Yael Allweil explains 
that, “Israel’s housing regime was intended to provide housing for each citizen as a fulfillment of 
the right of each Jew to the ancestral homeland in which he or she was being ‘re-rooted’.”14  In 
this view of things, which has been operative since the 1860s, producing a national home 
requires the housing of Jewish nationals.15 This is a condition for their transformation into self-
governing members to a legitimate state; however, this has always been at the cost of the 
Mizrahim and Palestinian Arabic population.16 
State Engineered Segregation 
With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the segregation of communities 
based on ethnic and religious identities was formally regulated, after a war that displaced 
approximately 700,000 Palestinians who either escaped or were forced to leave from at least 350 
villages.17 Nearly 200,000 Palestinians remained in Israel, however, most lived in the northern 
peripheries of the state, in the Negev, and Galilee.18 After 1948, hundreds of thousands of 
Mizrahi immigrants, primarily from Africa and the Arab world, arrived in Israel, tripling the 
population of Jewish citizens within a decade.19 
 
14 Yael Allweil, “Building a Home-Land: Zionism as a Regime of Housing 1860-2005” (UC Berkeley, 2011), 12, 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7c608798. 
15 Allweil, “Building a Home-Land.” 
16 Mizrahim are descendants of local Jewish communities in the Muslim countries in Asia and North Africa. 
17 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 382. 
18 Erez Tzfadia, “Public Housing as Control: Spatial Policy of Settling Immigrants in Israeli Development Towns,” 
Housing Studies 21, no. 4 (July 2006): 524. 
19Aziza Khazzoom, “Did the Israeli State Engineer Segregation? On the Placement of Jewish Immigrants in 




 By the early 1960s, the state had both ownership and control of 93 percent of all the land 
that had been occupied in 1948, all of which was supposed to be maintained as public domain.20 
However, as Alexander Kedar noted in his research on the “transformation” of land ownership in 
the period after the war, the Israel Land Administration (ILA), which is the government agency 
responsible for managing national landholdings, does not have a single Palestinian representative 
among its 22 Board members: 12 are from government ministries and 10 are representatives of 
the Jewish National Fund.21 This lack of representation in a key government planning 
organizations is also reflected in how the state provisioned public housing.  
       Development Towns 
The ILA initially constructed Israel so it would not have inner cities, as much as it would 
outer cities which Israeli scholars today call “development towns.”22 Development towns were 
created by the ILA to provide permanent housing for the massive wave of holocaust survivors as 
well as Jewish immigrants primarily from African countries including Yemen, Egypt, and 
Morocco. According to geographer Oren Yiftachel and many others, the state placed migrant 
Jews on the peripheries of the country as a way to both occupy these regions and to control 
Jewish and Palestinian demographics particularly in areas around the 1949 Green Line.23 
Moreover, in the 1950s, the state intended for these development towns to play an economic 
function by subsidizing and supporting the creation of low-skilled manufacturing industries. The 
 
20 Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, “The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law and the Palestinian 
Landholder 1948-1967,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 33, no. 4 (2001): 946. 
21 Yoav Mehozay, “The Rule of Difference: How Emergency Powers Prevent Palestinian Assimilation in Israel,” 
Israel Studies Review 27, no. 2 (2012): 21. 
22 Khazzoom, “Did the Israeli State Engineer Segregation?”; Tzfadia, “Public Housing as Control”; Oren Yiftachel, 
“Social Control, Urban Planning and Ethno-Class Relations: Mizrahi Jews in Israel’s ‘Development Towns,’” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, no. 2 (2000): 418–38; Yossi Yonah and Ishak Saporta, 
“The Politics of Lands and Housing in Israel: A Wayward Republican Discourse,” Social Identities 8, no. 1 (March 
2002): 91–117. 
23 Khazzoom, “Did the Israeli State Engineer Segregation?”; Yiftachel, “Social Control, Urban Planning and Ethno-




kibbutzim model, which was primarily founded by and for Ashkenazi Jews, played a similar 
function to the development towns.24  
By the 1970s, Israel faced a major economic recession and much of the country, except for 
the development towns and kibbutzim, began transitioning into a post-industrial economy.25 This 
created mass unemployment for residents in the development towns, which in turn, led to “high 
levels of poverty and welfare dependency, single motherhood, depression, alcoholism, and 
school dropout, as well as lower educational and occupational attainment.”26 The kibbutzim and 
most Ashkenazim, however, did not share the same fate as their Mizrahim counterparts living in 
the development towns.27 
Since 85 to 90 percent of development town residents were Mizrahi Jews, an association 
formed between Mizrahi identity, peripheral locality, and economic deprivation.28 In some ways, 
as Oren Yiftachel and Erez Tzfadia described it, these development towns came to resemble 
many inner cities in the United States: “physically isolated, heavily minority areas characterized 
by low quality schooling and dominated by secondary labour markets.”29 Consequently, when 
the mass of Mizrahim in development towns lost their jobs after the 1970 economic recession, 
they emerged as an economic and social underclass. There also emerged a suburbanization of 
 
24 Uriel Leviatan, “Ethnic Differences in Attitudes Toward the Kibbutz,” Israel Social Science Research 6, no. 2 
(1988): 23–52; Oren Yiftachel, “Nation‐building and the Division of Space: Ashkenazi Domination in the Israeli 
‘Ethnocracy,’” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 4, no. 3 (September 1998): 33–58; Yuval Achouch and Yoann 
Morvan, “The Kibbutz and ‘Development Towns’ in Israel: Zionist Utopias: Ideals Ensnared in a Tormented 
History,” Justice Spatiale-Spatial Justice 5 (December 2012): 25; Moti Gigi, “Relations between Development 
Towns and Kibbutzim,” Israel Studies Review 33, no. 3 (December 1, 2018): 121–39; Seymour Spilerman and Jack 
Habib, “Development Towns in Israel: The Role of Community in Creating Ethnic Disparities in Labour Force 
Characteristics,” American Journal of Sociology 81, no. 4 (1976): 781–812. 
25 Khazzoom, “Did the Israeli State Engineer Segregation?” 116. 
26 Aziza Khazzoom, "Did the Israeli State Engineer Segregation," 116. 
27 Achouch and Morvan, “The Kibbutz and "Development Towns" in Israel: Zionist Utopias: Ideals Ensnared in a 
Tormented History.” 
28 Oren Yiftachel and Erez Tzfadia, “Between Periphery and ‘Third Space’: Identity of Mizrahim in Israel’s 
Development Towns,” in Israelis in Conflict: Hegemonies, Identities and Challenges (Sussex Academic Press, 
2004), 208. 




low-skilled jobs and lack of services, all of which occurred within this larger dynamic of Israel.30 
The final result of such state building of these towns and placing immigrants in them was an 
overrepresentation of Mizrahi Jews in state-created ghettos.  
The Israeli land and housing regime contributed to the low stratification of Mizrahim in 
development towns and bound them to the towns. Even when Mizrahi landlords sought to sell 
their apartments in order to leave the towns, they found that property values were insufficient for 
them to move elsewhere in Israel.31 Moreover, the interaction between ethnicity and human 
capital was such that even so-called ‘high-status’ Mizrahim immigrants were as likely to be sent 
to the towns as low-status Ashkenazim.32  
As previously mentioned, these development towns played a major role in the removal of 
indigenous Palestinians off the land altogether and into peripheral regions where the state can 
gain easy control of them.33 As almost all Palestinian properties were subsequently nationalized 
by the state of Israel as mandated by the 1950 Absentees Property Law, most of the remaining 
Palestinian families lost the private property titles to their land and houses and became renters of 
public housing.34 Housing conditions among the poorest Palestinian population in Jaffa 
deteriorated further over the following decades, as they were dependent on public housing 
 
30 Khazzoom, “Did the Israeli State Engineer Segregation?” 116.  
31 Yonah and Saporta, “The Politics of Lands and Housing in Israel,” 97. 
32 Ashkenazim are descendants of local Jewish communities in the dominantly Christian countries in Europe; 
Tzfadia, “Public Housing as Control,” 527. 
33 Gershon Shafir, Land, Labour and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914 (Berkeley, 
California, United States: University of California Press, 1996). 
34 Defines persons who were expelled, fled or who left the country after 29 November 1947, mainly due to the war, 
as well as their movable and immovable property (mainly land, houses and bank accounts etc.), as “absentee”. Lyle 
Plocher, “Foreigner’s Guide to Property Market: Who Owns the Land?,” The Jerusalem Post, July 31, 2011, 
https://www.jpost.com/business/real-estate/foreigners-guide-to-property-market-who-owns-the-land; Chaim 
Weizmann, “Absentees’ Property Law,” 5710 § (1950), 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns1_property_eng.pdf; Sebastian Schipper, “Social Movements in 
an Era of Post-Democracy: How the Israeli J14 Tent Protests of 2011 Challenged Neoliberal Hegemony through the 




programmes managed by often hostile Israeli state agencies.35 Consequently, many development 
towns were built on abandoned Palestinian towns and villages or expropriated Palestinian 
lands.36 Construction, allocation and management of housing were rolled out by the State of 
Israel to serve national goals of spatial and social control, for the benefit of its dominant group.37 
Since the 1960s, the Israeli state has had control over 93 percent of the land which can be 
divided into three categories: all the land that was subject to the British Mandate (69%), all the 
land that was confiscated in accordance with the Absentee Land Law and the Land Purchase 
Law (12%), and all the land owned by the National Jewish Fund (12%).38 The majority of this 
land is only made available to Israeli citizens or Jewish non-residents through long-term leases of 
49 to 98 years. The remaining 7 percent of Israeli land that was not under government control 
was supposed to be equally divided between Jews and Palestinians; therefore, this meant that 
approximately 20 percent of Israel’s Palestinian population has access to only 3.5 percent of the 
land.39 
There have been no new Palestinian towns developed since 1948 and although in 
principle, Palestinians can buy homes anywhere in Israel, in practice, they face major social and 
institutional obstacles that prevent them from acquiring land.40 Palestinians have fought against 
housing discrimination practices in the Israeli High Court of Justice, winning both Ahadal 
Qaadan v. ILA and Zbidaht v. ILA, that ruled sellers could no longer discriminate against 
disqualifying prospective Palestinian buyers for lack of suitable characteristics. However, these 
 
35 Schipper, “Social Movements in an Era of Post-Democracy: How the Israeli J14 Tent Protests of 2011 Challenged 
Neoliberal Hegemony through the Production of Place,” 820. 
36 Geremy Forman and Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, “From Arab Land to ‘Israel Lands’: The Legal Dispossession of 
the Palestinians Displaced by Israel in the Wake of 1948,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 
6 (December 1, 2004): 809–30. 
37 Tzfadia, “Public Housing as Control,” 528. 
38 Plocher, “Foreigner’s Guide to Property Market.” 
39 Kedar, “The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography,” 946. 




verdicts have had little impact on land allocation and the Knesset enacted a bill in 2011 that 
allows settler communities to exclude prospective buyers if they do not fit the “community 
profile.”41 
Part II: Subsidizing the Occupation 
 With the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied the remainder of the Mandate Palestine with 
territories in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip from Egypt (see fig. 
1).42 
 
Figure 1. Map of Israel-Palestine-Egypt Before and After the Six-Day War (1967). Created by Jeremy 
Bowen. From BBC News Services. 
https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/655E/production/_96305952_israel-before-after-v18.png. 
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 Levi Eshkol’s Labour government pushed for settlement-building in these territories under the 
guise of national security and the historical claims arising from the location of Jewish settlements  
and communities that existed before 1948.43 The Allon Plan, led by Ministerial Committee on 
the Settlements’ Yigal Allon, became the foundation for Israeli settlement-building.44 As the 
justification for these settlements was mainly on the grounds of national security, many of them 
started as military bases outside areas still inhabited by Palestinians.45 The remaining settlements 
were established under the pretenses of being work camps and archaeological excavations.46 In 
1977, Menachem Begin, the founder of Likud, came into power with settlement expansion as a 
priority. The Likud government planned to settle two million Jews in the West Bank alone by 
2000.47 
The state of Israel introduced neoliberal measures in the 1980s in response to the 
prolonged Israeli economic crisis of the 1970s which were characterized by stagflation that came 
to a peak in the wake of the 1983 bank crisis.48 The newly-formed national unity government, 
headed by Shimon Peres, set out to solve the crisis by a forceful intervention to restructure 
political-economic relations in the country.49 The result of these efforts was the so-called 
Economic Stabilization Plan in 1985, which introduced “the greatly reduced government 
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subsidies, devaluation of the currency, restrictions on wage growth, opening the economy to 
foreign capital, and privatization.”50 Similar to developments in other states, the neoliberal turn 
entailed cuts in welfare programs, a wave of privatization, and an emphasis on the individual 
taking responsibility for their socio-economic situations.51  Unlike elsewhere, however, the 
Israeli government retained pockets of the welfare state for Israeli citizens – living in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
Historian Gadi Algazi notes that “accelerated privatization went hand in hand with a 
colonial project heavily subsidized by the same state that shrank from public investment in social 
services within its pre-1967 borders.”52 In this regard, sociologist Daniel Gutwein talks about 
settlements as the “compensatory mechanism” for the struggling Israeli Jewish middle class.53 
While the Israeli state was involved in supporting the settlements from the very beginning 
through providing security and other basic means, the neoliberal era had brought the Israeli 
governments to dedicate substantial financial support for the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank.  
These incentives were and continue to be as considerable as they are diverse. The Israeli 
state covered a significant part of building costs, charged building companies a much lesser 
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percentage of the value of the land, and provided settlers with access to government-subsidized 
mortgages.54 Overall, sociologist Swirski has reported that between 1967 and 2003: 
… government surplus funding of the settlements – that is, the funds allocated above and 
beyond what the government would have invested were the settlements erected on the 
Israeli side of the Green Line – came to NIS 45 billion.55  
 
All these benefits result in significantly cheaper housing in the West Bank vis-a-vis Israeli state 
funding, with the average cost of an apartment in a settlement as low as half compared with 
prices in Tel Aviv-Yaffo.56 
 It was this process of “urban sprawl” that was politically utilized by the Likud 
government in the 1980s by pushing the population into the Occupied Territories through the 
incentives as previously mentioned.57 By subsidizing the prices of land, providing cheap loans 
and allocating significant budget to local municipalities in the settlements, the state succeeded in 
motivating a large number of Israelis to move to the West Bank, a significant portion of whom 
would otherwise not consider it.58 This strategy has remained essentially a constant repertoire of 
Israeli governments since then. 
What is particular about the suburbanization in Israel-Palestine is what geographer 
Shalom Reichman called “the line of price discontinuity.”59 Usually, the prices of land and 
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houses decline linearly with distance from the metropolitan area, but in the case of Israel-
Palestine, “the crossing of the old Green Line boundary causes a sudden discontinuity in the land 
market, characterized by an extremely sharp (rather than gradual) fall in land prices” because of 
the contested status of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories.60 Thus, when combined 
with governmental subsidies, moving to settlements makes even more sense.  
Moreover, the relocation to the West Bank was significantly facilitated by the 
settlements’ proximity to the Green Line. As noted by geographer David Newman, unlike in 
other colonial contexts in which colonists would have to move overseas, in case of 
Israel/Palestine “the territory in question was physically adjacent to the mother country, 
requiring families to move no more than a few kilometers from their previous homes.”61 This 
means that settlers can move to new, more affordable communities without undergoing 
inconveniences like looking for new jobs or disruptions of existing social relations.62 Because of 
that, the state also did not have to spend resources for creating job opportunities in the area in 
order to attract new settlers.63 In this regard, Newman talks about settlements’ “double 
centrality” which stands for “central location with the economic benefits of the periphery.”64 
Part III: Tel Aviv-Yaffo and the Nation-wide Housing Crisis 
Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
Tel Aviv-Yaffo is Israel's second-largest city, and a cosmopolitan, cultural and financial 
global city. It is also one of a few wealthy cities that is not financially supported by the Ministry 
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of the Interior.65 Based on these material conditions, municipal political elites “maintained an 
inclusive self-governing attitude, attempting to run the city’s municipal and financial affairs 
independent of the central government,” and have constructed an image of Tel Aviv-Yaffo as 
separate from the national state apparatus.66 As a result, Tel Aviv-Yaffo “remains the most 
independent municipality in Israel” with a robust political body that has established progressive 
municipal policies: for instance, in the fields of labour migration, LGBT rights, education, and 
health.67 
According to urban historian Talia Margalit, Tel Aviv-Yaffo’s long history of 
entrepreneurial urban development strategies is reflected in flexible planning regulations like 
spot-zoning, public-private development ventures, luxurious building projects, and large-scale 
privatizations of fixed public assets and landed properties.68 Urban geographer Sebastian 
Schipper explains: 
As municipal finances are heavily dependent on the appropriation of ground rent, local 
planning practices are predominantly shaped by profit-maximizing considerations that 
direct most planning activities towards the luxury market.69  
 
As a consequence, lucrative real estate developments such as high-rise residential towers have 
dominated the flow of capital into the built environment since the 1990s, not only because they 
produce the most private profits, but also because they contribute “to the city coffers along with 
the national budget, whether directly through the privatization process or through high taxation 
 
65 Nurit Alfasi and Tovi Fenster, “Between the ‘Global’ and the ‘Local’: On Global Locality and Local Globality,” 
Urban Geography 30, no. 5 (July 2009): 543–66. 
66 Nurit Alfasi and Tovi Fenster, “A Tale of Two Cities: Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in an Age of Globalization,” Cities 
22, no. 5 (October 2005): 352. 
67 Alfasi and Fenster, 358. 
68 Talia Margalit, “Public Assets vs. Public Interest: Fifty Years of High-Rise Building in Tel Aviv-Jaffa,” 
Geography Research Forum 29 (2009): 48–82; Talia Margalit, “Land, Politics and High-Rise Planning: Ongoing 
Development Practices in Tel Aviv–Yafo,” Planning Perspectives 28, no. 3 (July 2013): 373–97. 
69 Sebastian Schipper, “Urban Social Movements and the Struggle for Affordable Housing in the Globalizing City of 





for the extra building permits.”70 As such, Margalit concludes that the general acceptance of 
neoliberal planning strategies among local political elites is based on a hegemonic order 
established over decades that “equates public interests with increased public financial resources, 
while ignoring questions of social justice and sacrificing public and environmental assets.”71 The 
fact that almost no public housing construction has occurred in Tel Aviv-Yaffo since 1993 
perhaps best illustrates the entrenched neglect of the housing needs of the urban poor.72  
All these policies and trend led to a boom in the real estate market and a significant rise 
in housing prices in the city that went up to an 11% price increase per year.73 While the housing 
market in Israel is generally dominated by homeownership, the situation in Tel Aviv-Yaffo is 
different: where a slight majority of 46.4% (in relation to 45.6% homeowners) rent their 
apartment—often because homeownership has become out of reach even for young middle-class 
households.74 Households are exposed to sharp price hikes and high insecurity of tenure, as the 
rental market in Israel is one of the most liberalized markets in the developed world.75 Indeed, 
“the state does not intervene at all in the terms of the rental contract, the level of rent, or the 
frequency that it is raised.”76 Between 2008 and 2013, average rents in Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
increased, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), by 61% to NIS 5117—which 
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represents 56% of the average gross monthly wage in Israel.77 As a result, not only low-income 
households but even “middle-class families, young professionals and students are increasingly 
finding housing in the city unaffordable” or are threatened by displacement.78 Due to a severe 
housing crisis and the fact that the national government remains very reluctant to seriously 
intervene in housing markets in a non-neoliberal manner that restricts the commodity character 
of housing. Airbnb has been able to come in and exploit the housing shortage, lack of housing 
regulations, and precarious residents. 
The 2011 Housing Protests 
Issues of segregation are more exaggerated and complex given Israel’s ongoing struggle 
with its shortage of land, and more recently, a major housing crisis. For those living on the 
margins, a housing crisis can mean further exacerbation of poor living conditions as more 
families begin to cram into smaller apartments, or even become homeless. 
In 2011, Israel experienced its largest nation-wide protest to date. These demonstrations 
were given many different names by the Israeli media; however, the most common ones were 
“The Social Protest”, “Housing Protest”, and the “J14 Movement.” Given this is in a country 
accustomed to the unrivalled ascendancy of security and geopolitics, mass protests under the 
banner of “the people demand social justice”, although for just a moment, was significant.79 
These mass demonstrations were a part of the popular protest movements that had swept the 
world protesting the high cost of living and neoliberal hegemony (i.e. the Occupy movements).80 
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While Israel was one of the most equitable Western societies in terms of income and wealth 
amongst its Jewish population, with the coming of neoliberalism, it has become one of the most 
socioeconomically polarised societies in the world.81 The rising cost of housing turned income 
erosion and socio-economic polarisation into aggravated problems, as both inflation-adjusted 
housing prices and rents rose by about 50% during the years before the protest.82 The movement 
began with young Ashkenazim but quickly expanded to include more deprived social groups, 
such as Arab-Palestinian citizens, migrant workers, and the Mizrahi Jewish lower classes.83 
Mizrahi citizens are more dependent on public housing than their Ashkenazi counterparts, 
due to the historically rooted ethno-class division of Israeli society and the way in which the state 
had allocated housing to Mizrahim. When some of these neighbourhoods became obstacles to 
urban gentrification, Mizrahim were forced, against their will and despite violent demonstrations, 
to move to other "modern" poor neighbourhoods.84 The pattern is clear and systematic. Mizrahi 
areas were forcibly vacated and immediately became the object of major investments leading to 
Ashkenazi gentrification, all while the newly adopted Mizrahi neighbourhoods became defunded 
slums.85 For this reason, Levinsky Park in Tel Aviv became one of the main bases for the J14 
movement as it was located close to the two most neglected Mizrahi ghettos in the area that best 
represented multiple forms of oppression and exclusion.86 The park was once a Mizrahi working-
class housing area and in less than 5 years had become a temporary living space for the 
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homeless, substance abusers, migrant workers, and Eritrean and Sudanese refugees.87 This area 
was the perfect visual representation of both the housing crisis’s impact and the state’s neglect of 
the Mizrahi communities. Mizrahi neighbourhoods are currently led down two paths: either 
gentrification or such severe neglect by the state that they become uninhabitable.  
Palestinian citizens in Israel, on the other hand, had a very different relationship with 
public housing and the housing crisis in comparison to both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jewish 
citizens. In the 1970s, when the availability of public housing decreased dramatically, the state 
began using modernist urban planning practices of slum clearing, failed urban renewal strategies, 
systematic disinvestment, often resulting in the demolition of many Palestinian 
neighbourhoods.88 Since the mid-1980s, a radical shift towards neoliberal planning and urban 
redevelopment policies occurred, which resulted in the rehabilitation of neglected public 
infrastructures and the privatization of public housing and luxurious waterfront developments 
along the Mediterranean shoreline.89 Many Palestinian residents interpreted the steady rent 
increases and gentrification processes that ensued as a further ‘Judaization’ of Jaffa, as their 
families were forced to squat in “empty public houses designated to be sold to private 
developers.”90 In 2007, the ILA issued almost 500 eviction orders to families charged with the 
illegal construction of extensions to their overcrowded public housing apartments.91 As of 2013, 
800 Jaffa families of an Arab-Palestinian community of about 18,000 people faced eviction 
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orders from public housing agencies.92 Thus, throughout the three months of a nationwide 
protest, Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel were usually reluctant to join, as they were faced with 
housing hardships for substantially different reasons that were deeply rooted in institutional and 
political discrimination on national grounds different than in the case of the Jewish majority.93 
However, many Palestinians concluded that:  
… the J14 protests offered a unique opportunity to integrate the decades-long local 
struggle for the right to housing and against displacement from Jaffa into a broader mass 
movement also focused on housing issues.94 
 
Thus, this movement initiated a nationwide, multi-ethnic public housing movement struggling 
against evictions, privatizations, and the demolition of public housing apartments.  
Anthropologist Callie Maidhof points out that the majority of J14 participants protested 
the state’s budgetary considerations and what was considered by many to be the provision of a 
welfare state for settlers and religious Jews at the expense of secular Israelis.95 To be clear, these 
protests were not against the immorality of settlement-building or of living in a settlement, but 
about the disproportionate level of funding and secular citizens’ tax dollars required to keep 
these settlements in place at the cost of offering rent support to those living within the Green 
Line.96 Interviewing many of the settlers, Maidhof explains that many of these settlers had 
moved into these settlements when they could no longer afford to live within the Green Line and 
felt themselves a part of the rent price hike protests.97 
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Netanyahu’s Affordable Housing Solution 
 After the J14 mass protests, Netanyahu’s government came out with their “Supertanker” 
policy.98 Named after the aerial firefighting airplane that was deployed to extinguish the biggest 
forest fire in Israel’s history, the policy was aimed at subordinating the housing planning 
authority to market calculus and inflating the housing supply through outpost authorization.99 
The Israeli government approved the legalization of three settlements (Sansana, Bruchin, 
Rechelim) which meant the establishment of new Israeli settlements for the first time since 
1990.100  
In November 2012, the United Nations upgraded Palestine to non-member Observer State 
status in the United Nations Assembly.101 Following the UN decision to accept a Palestinian state 
alongside Israel, Netanyahu approved eleven thousand housing units in Jerusalem and West 
Bank.102 According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), from 2010 to 2012, 
investment in settlements grew by at least 17%.103 Sociologist Shlomo Swirski found that on top 
of that, in 2012 alone, the government invested more per capita in settlements than within Israel, 
mainly for education and welfare services.104 Thus, while Israeli citizens living inside the Green 
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Line were demanding the return of the welfare state, Netanyahu diverted all that funding to 
settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.   
 The Israeli state’s housing project was more of an ideological project that sought to 
materialize the once reactionary utopian Zionist discourse than it was a welfare-state housing 
program. The establishment of the state of Israel created racial segregation through public 
housing provisions, but which have resulted in stark socio-economic divisions between 
Ashkenazi, Mizrahi and Palestinian communities seen even in Tel Aviv-Yaffo today. The state-
engineered segregation, economic recession of the 1970s, defunding of public housing, and 
funding diverted to occupying the West Bank led to the 2011 J14 housing protests. Instead of 
subsidizing rent or the cost-of-living in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, Netanyahu increased settlement-
building in the West Bank through a “Supertanker policy” that subordinated the housing 
authority to a neoliberal market logic and set out a political campaign to frame West Bank 
settlements as an affordable housing option. While the gentrification of Tel Aviv-Yaffo and the 
colonization of the West Bank have been existing trends, Airbnb has accelerated some processes, 
largely indirectly, by introducing new capital flow via peer-to-peer networks. As part of a matrix 
of housing policy, transnational capital movements, Israel’s neoliberal economic policy, and 
political ideologies, Airbnb can be seen to be playing some part in practices that displace 
marginalized groups in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, exacerbate affordable housing shortages, and may even 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sharing Economy 
The sharing economy has captured the Israeli-Palestinian market and has played some 
role in accelerating existing historical trends (i.e., gentrification, colonization, and precarious 
employment) to unprecedented levels. Israel-Palestine has the perfect conditions for such an 
economy to flourish: a leading global tech sector, housing shortage, a growing precarious job 
market, and all in a very small country. Sharing platforms have framed collaborative 
consumption to be the solution to market shortages and precarity. This thesis, however, 
demonstrates otherwise.  
Driven by technological, economic, and environmental considerations, people 
increasingly organize the collaborative consumption of goods and services over the internet.106 
Cohen and Kietzmann describe the sharing economy as a system in which people share 
‘underutilized’ resources through peer-to-peer networks.107 This includes “peer-to-peer-based 
activities of obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services, coordinated through 
community-based online services.”108 The sharing economy has changed our perceived value of 
ownership. Consumers can now enjoy goods and services only when they are required or desired 
without obtaining ownership and the involved obligations.109 
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The sharing economy features a paradoxical neoliberal dichotomy: community optimism 
and commercial extractivism.110 The platform advertises itself as bringing the community 
together through positive values of “sharing” and “sustainability”, while exploiting reproductive 
forms of labour for the creation of value, neglecting non-market transactions, and ignoring 
community activities beyond “the market” as viable and sustainable forms of economy.111 More 
accurately, the sharing economy is a product of neoliberalism in that it is a platform that pushes 
for many laisse-faire policies and existing economic liberal trends: unregulated marketplaces, 
unprotected labour markets, tax avoidance, and a transfer of risks to individual users. For 
instance, Airbnb is constantly negotiating with governments to secure regulations that allow it to 
maintain and profit from its activities in different cities around the world – leading to further 
deregulation of tourist and housing markets.112 These interventions have provided important 
evidence of the growing impact of the sharing platform on a local, national, and global scale. 
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 For many, ideas of home are closely tied to homeownership. In Marxist accounts, home-
ownership is seen as instrumental to capitalism and used to forward an ideological agenda aimed 
at economic efficiency and growth.113 In Israel and many Western countries, home-ownership is 
supported by governments through state policies and heavily promoted by the real estate 
industry.114 According to critical geographer David Harvey, homeownership incentivizes 
workers to remain committed to their jobs to pay off their mortgages, and signals identification 
with and the incorporation of capitalist values.115 In the last few decades, the global struggles 
over housing and associated practices of displacement and dispossession are testimonies to our 
changing conceptions of “home”.116 Ongoing external pressures such as the affordability of 
housing, housing instability, and lack of autonomy may affect whether or not one feels at 
home.117 
Gentrification 
Sharing platforms like Airbnb have contributed to a profound social transformation of 
many places around the world.118 In recent years, Airbnb’s role in accelerating gentrification and 
its disruption of the housing market has caused an uproar amongst housing advocates and anti-
gentrification activists. Scholars have started to take note of the “Airbnb effect” on cities while 
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other studies aim at informing future urban policy and planning in response to these recent 
trends.119  
There are various theories employed throughout the years to understand gentrification. 
The most commonly used theory of gentrification is the ‘Stage Theory’.120 The theory suggests 
that gentrification passes through different phases over time, and that “the characteristics and 
attitudes of people moving into the neighbourhood vary depending on when they moved in.”121 
While the first wave of gentrifiers cherishes a neighbourhood’s diversity, authenticity and unique 
architecture, the later wave of arrivals are generally middle-class gentrifiers who seek a high 
quality of life and socioeconomically similar neighbours. Stage theory suggests that the first 
wave of ‘urban pioneers’ should retrospectively be referred to as gentrifiers as well, even if few 
enough moved into the neighbourhood at the time to not affect the local urban environment.122 
Using this framework, scholars have categorized gentrifiers according to demographic 
characteristics, such as “visibility and tenure, occupation and income, political outlook, cultural 
affiliation, and household composition and lifestyle.”123 Alongside typical professional and 
managerial middle classes, scholars also emphasize other marginal groups as gentrifiers: artists, 
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the gay community, students and Bohemians, and all those searching for cheap rents, large 
working spaces, community life and authenticity.124 While these groups are commonly 
understood as symbolically and culturally middle-class from a Bourdieu perspective, they are 
economically low-income and marginal relative to the managerial class.125 Their move may 
subject long-term residents to cultural, political or social marginalization, which in turn may 
result in ‘displacement pressure’, leading to actual displacement.126 While these accounts are 
invaluable in understanding the “chaotic concept of gentrification”, they depict gentrification as 
a pre-determined process that leaves little room for deviations.  
Other explanations of gentrification interpret the process as an essentially structural one, 
viewing gentrification as the outcome of economic and/or political power structures. 127 These 
theories, most notably ‘the rent gap’ theory’, help understand the role of banks, developers, 
investors and authorities in channelling capital into formerly neglected places such as Airbnb.128 
Wachsmuth and Weisler introduced the rent gap mechanism that allows Airbnb to be a major 
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driver of gentrification in New York City neighbourhoods.129 Nonetheless, such explanations fail 
to explain what makes people, especially early-wave gentrifiers, move to such areas. In addition, 
neither the stage theory nor the rent gap model capture gentrification in our increasingly 
globalized cities. 
Transnational Gentrification 
A growing scholarly literature places gentrification in a global context by extending the 
range of case studies and incorporating transnational perspectives in comparative studies.130 
Building on what until recently comprised just a few scattered case studies, scholars have 
investigated gentrification in East Asia, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere, providing insights 
that expand the boundaries (both theoretically and spatially) of gentrification research.131 In 
addition to broadening the empirical scope of research, gentrification scholars have also begun to 
explicitly consider the theoretical relationship between gentrification and globalization, generally 
via one of two pathways.  
First is the argument proposed by geographer Neil Smith and later substantiated by a 
range of case studies, that gentrification has become a global strategy by which “urban 
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entrepreneurial governance seeks to secure investment in cities across the world.”132 Here 
globalization refers to an economic restructuring that has destabilized nation-states as the 
preeminent form of a territorial organization while strengthening functional connections between 
the urban and global scales.133 The result of this urban rescaling, Smith claimed, was that 
gentrification has “rapidly descended the urban hierarchy”, and become an increasingly 
ubiquitous phenomenon in ordinary cities as well as in so-called global ones.134 Particularly as 
gentrification has become a state-led strategy, actively facilitated by municipal, regional and 
national governments in cooperation with large capital, a gentrification ‘template’ has been 
replicated in cities around the world.135 
The second proposed relationship between gentrification and globalization has been via 
the subjective identity of the gentrifying class. Geographer Matthew W. Rofe argues that 
globalization has rendered local experiences of neighbourhood change less uniquely distinctive 
and more readily comparable with neighbourhood change elsewhere in the world, at least for 
local gentrifiers.136 These actors thus come to understand themselves as part of a global, 
cosmopolitan class and consuming a globally homogenous ‘gentrification commodity’. The same 
global economic restructuring processes that make gentrification practically available as a 
strategy of entrepreneurial urban governance also make it imaginatively available as the basis for 
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a cosmopolitan identity among local gentrifiers.137 Despite the different theoretical and 
sometimes normative aspects of these perspectives, what they share is an orientation towards 
gentrification as a local outcome of globalized socio-spatial processes. From this understanding, 
global capital is investing in uneven local property markets, which are moulded to satisfy the 
preferences of a local urban middle class, along with a new subjectivity wherein this gentrifying 
class imagines itself to be part of an international cosmopolitan class. 
Here, following Sigler and Waschmuth, I wish to focus on a third understanding of 
globalization’s relationship with gentrification, one much less explored in the existing literature. 
Gentrification is not a result of globalization processes that are distinct from gentrification, as in 
both the ‘global strategy’ and ‘cosmopolitan class’ arguments, but as an active pathway along 
which globalization processes unfold. Sigler and Waschmuth identify ‘transnational 
gentrification’ as “… a process that connects leisure-driven migration to spatially distant 
neighbourhood reinvestment schemes that existing local demand may not have allowed for.”138 
The concept of transnational gentrification draws theoretical attention to the relationship between 
gentrification and migration. Researchers have explored such linkages, but overwhelmingly in 
the South-North direction, insofar as particular migrant groups have been wrapped up in the 
gentrification process.139 However, little research has been done on the relationship between 
gentrification and colonization in Israel-Palestine.  
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Israeli Literature on Airbnb 
Existing Israeli scholarly and grey literature on Airbnb has almost exclusively examined 
Airbnb’s activities through a legal and regulatory lens. Elster and Nesher and Yaniv have 
examined public policy approaches for regulating Airbnb’s activities in Tel Aviv-Yaffo and 
Jerusalem.140 Legal scholars Beirach and Yifat have examined the legal status of these 
apartments-turned-hotels and the impact they had on marginalized neighbourhoods in Tel Aviv-
Yaffo and Jerusalem.141 Israeli-Palestinian peace organizations, such as Peace Now and Jewish 
Voices for Peace, have recognized and reported on the growing number of settler-run Airbnbs in 
the West Bank.142 Törnberg and Chiappini were the first scholars to make the connection 
between New York Airbnbs and their use of colonial discourse and an appeal to “adventure” to 
advertise to potential white hosts.143 However, none of the literature examines the relationship 
between gentrification in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, the ways in which it impacts the West Bank, and how 
Airbnb fits into this relationship. I will be applying the American/Anglo Airbnb literature on 
gentrification and colonization to consider how Airbnb activities unfold in particular ways within 
the colonial context.  
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
Homesharing platforms, including Airbnb, do not provide public data on numbers and 
performance of their rentals. Airbnb has historically been secretive about its data, even when 
faced with legal requirements, and when they have released data, observers have concluded that 
they have done so in a misleading fashion.144At the end of 2015, Airbnb stopped disclosing when 
a non-available property was reserved or was simply blocked from new reservations, which 
made it impossible to precisely measure occupancy.145 Therefore, my main sources of 
information are official databases (i.e. from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics and Tel Aviv 
Municipality Statistics) on housing in Tel Aviv-Yaffo and data on Airbnb from existing Israeli 
scholarly literature, grey literature, and Israeli newspapers. In light of the recent COVID-19 
Pandemic, the ongoing travel restrictions and bans have made fieldwork unfeasible, so my 
analysis will only employ secondary data.  
My approach in analyzing gentrification in Tel Aviv-Yaffo uses two types of sources: 
statistical use of official data and existing Israeli literature on Airbnb’s activities in Tel Aviv-
Yaffo. For the sake of simplicity and the limited data released by Israeli official sources, the 
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Table 1. Gentrification Measurements for Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
 
2017 2018 2019 
Monthly Rent 
The sum of all contract rent 
generated in the long-term 
rental market 
 ₪  1,081,508,400.00   ₪  1,107,772,410.00   ₪  1,190,399,850.00  
Average rent  
Average Monthly Rent  
 ₪                5,517.90   ₪                 5,603.30   ₪                 5,792.70  
Units (Jewish) 
Total Jewish households  
187,000                       190,800                        196,800  
Units (Occupied)  
Total Number of Occupied 
Residential Units 
196,000 197,700 205,500 
Units (Total) 
Total number of housing units, 
occupied or not 
                      205,533                        208,821                        210,795  
Units (Vacant for Rent)   
Total number of units 
“vacant”  
9,533 11,121 5,295 
 
Source: Tel Aviv-Yaffo Statistical Database and the Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
From the Tel Aviv Municipality Statistics, I have gathered the following measurements 
calculated at the census-tract scale: average monthly rent ( חופשילפי דירה שכר של ממוצעים מחירים  
חדרים מספר הדירה גודל קבוצת  Table 4.30) and total number of housing units, occupied or not, in Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo (2019-1979 יחידות למגורים ,לפי אזור table 12.12).146 The average monthly rent was 
gathered to demonstrate the increase over the years. From Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, I 
have gathered the following measurements calculated at the census-tract scale: the number of 
occupied residential units in Tel Aviv-Yaffo ( דמוגרפיות תכונות :ומשפחות בית משקי  table 2), total 
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number of Jewish household in Tel Aviv-Yaffo ( דמוגרפיות תכונות :ומשפחות בית משקי  table 2), and 
total number of residential units vacant in Tel Aviv-Yaffo ( 100 מ יותר המונים ביישובים עיגון אחוזי - 
 The remaining information is gathered from Israeli scholarly publications, grey 147.(אלף תושבים
literature, and newspapers. 
My approach in analyzing colonization of the West Bank also uses two types of sources: 
statistical use of official data and existing Israeli literature and settlement watch reports on 
Airbnb’s activities in the West Bank. From the Tel Aviv Municipal Statistics database, I gathered 
data on how many residents moved from Tel Aviv-Yaffo into a West Bank settlement annually 
from 2014 to 2019. The data is further broken down by which area of Tel Aviv-Yaffo the 
residents have left, which is then compared to the neighbourhoods that were displaced by Airbnb 
the most.  See Table 4 for more detail.  Since prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, 
West Bank tourism has been an essential part of the Zionist enterprise. While Israel increases 
funding for tourism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel’s Ministry of Tourism does not 
disclose the data.148  Therefore, my thesis employs data from umbrella settler organizations and 
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various NGOs to examine the Israel’s tourism industry has grown in the region and the ways in 
which it has displaced Palestinians.149 
Limitations of the Research 
 There are two major limitations in this study that could be addressed in future research. 
First, the study focused on the ways in which Airbnb has impacted Tel Aviv-Yaffo’s real estate 
market and Isreal’s West Bank tourism industry. However, my thesis does not cover Palestinian-
run Airbnb neither in Tel Aviv-Yaffo nor the West Bank. While the topic of Palestinian-run 
Airbnb is important to examine, a 2018 report shows that Palestinian Airbnb hosts have been 
backlisted by the platform.150 This means the necessary data to examine this topic is very 
challenging to find without conducting fieldwork.  
Second, due to the lack of Airbnb data available, I could not provide a measure of the 
gentrification occurring in Tel Aviv-Yaffo that would isolate Airbnb as the cause, which would 
involve applying Wachsmuth and Weisler’s rent gap model.151 Following Israeli Airbnb 
researchers, my thesis uses the residential to commercial unit conversion rate, rising prices, and 
migration as an indicator of increasing gentrification in Tel Aviv-Yaffo. The residential to 
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commercial unit conversion rate is calculated by multiplying the number of Airbnb listings with 
the percentage of multi-listings and dividing that by the total number of residential units 
(occupied or not). Much like Wachsmuth and Weisler’s rent gap, the conversion rate and rising 
rent prices demonstrates that a decreasing supply of residential units and an increasing demand 
for short term rentals places an upward pressure on rent prices. This method, however, does not 
calculate the “gap” between actual returns for traditional landlords and potential returns after 
converting the unit into an Airbnb. For this reason, my next chapter dedicates a substantial 





CHAPTER IV: AIRBNB IN TEL AVIV-YAFFO 
Tel Aviv-Yaffo is one of Israel's most sought-after residential areas and Airbnb has 
gained more popularity in Tel Aviv-Yaffo than most other major cities. In San Francisco, the city 
where Airbnb began operations, there are almost twice as many residents and residential housing 
units as there are in Tel Aviv-Yaffo. In 2016, San Francisco had only about 7,000 Airbnb listings 
compared to about 8,600 listings in Tel Aviv-Yaffo.152 In Tel Aviv, there is an unprecedented 
number of apartments that have been converted into Airbnb hotels. To demonstrate the scope of 
Airbnb’s activities in Tel Aviv-Yafo, Table 2 compares Airbnb activities in Tel Aviv-Yaffo to 
other major cities around the world. 
Table 2: Airbnb Activity in Seven Major Cities 
















Turned to Airbnb 
Tel Aviv-Yaffo 9,152 55% 5,033 205,500 2.4% 
New York City 39,470 43% 16,972 3,464,00 0.5% 
Berlin 15,022 30% 4,506 1,900,00 0.2% 
Amsterdam 11,726 28% 3,283 428,000 0.8% 
Copenhagen 11,598 17% 1,971 498,000 0.4% 
Barcelona 17,541 66% 11,577 811,000 1.4% 
Paris 36,807 29% 10,674 1,160,000 0.9% 
Source: למלונות שהוסבו הדירות במספר לאומית-בין חריגה קיימת  אביב בתל  Airbnb [Record-Breaking Number of 
Apartments-turned-Airbnb-Hotels in Tel Aviv] Table adopted and translated from Tal Elster and Maayan 
Nesher, “ של מיטבית לרגולציה הצעה  Airbnb יפו-אביב בתל  [Policy Solution for Airbnb Regulations in Tel Aviv-
Yaffo]” (כן בתל אביב [Yes in Tel Aviv], May 2019)153 
 
As demonstrated by Table 2, Tel Aviv-Yaffo has an unusually high percentage of property 
owners with a large number of properties in their name (Multi-Listings) and an astronomical 
percentage of Airbnb listings in the total number of residential units. According to the percentage 
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of residential units turned to Airbnbs, the impact of Airbnb on the Tel Aviv-Yaffo housing 
market is exceptional as it is almost 2 times higher than in Barcelona, 3 times higher than in 
Amsterdam and Paris, almost 5 times more than in New York City, 6 times more than in 
Copenhagen and 12 times more than in Berlin. In terms of the impact Airbnb has had on 
neighbourhoods, New York City neighbourhoods with the largest Airbnb presences have had 
1.1% of apartments turned into Airbnb hotels in the Manhattan downtown area and 1.6% in 
Williamsburg, Brooklyn.154 However, according to Israeli scholars Beirach Barak and Yifat, the 
impact in comparison to marginalized Tel-Aviv neighbourhoods has been inordinate: in Kerem 
Hatemanim ( התימנים כרם ) more than 21% of apartments have been converted into Airbnb listings, 
in Neve Tzedek ( צדק נווה ) more than 13%, in North Jaffa ( יפו צפון ) more than 11%, and more than 
9% in Lev HaIr (לב העיר) and the HaTzafon HaYashan ( 155.(הצפון הישן See table 2 for the data on 
housing lost in Tel Aviv-Yaffo neighbourhoods and fig. 3 for a neighbourhood map of Tel Aviv-
Yaffo.  
Why Tel Aviv-Yaffo? 
Israeli scholars Elster and Neshel attribute Airbnb’s forceful impact on Tel Aviv-Yaffo to 
the fact that the tenant population being a significant portion of the city’s population.156 By 2015, 
over 50% of the city’s households live in rental units, the highest percentage of all the largest 
cities in the country.157 From the perspective of tenants in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, the thousands of 
apartments being used as short-term accommodations means a scarcity of apartments available 
for rent. As a result, Elster and Neshel argue that the decrease in the supply of apartments in Tel 
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Aviv has led to an increase in rent prices in the city.158 However, according to the United States 
Census Bureau, tenants make up 64.6% of New York City’s population and 60.1% of Los 
Angeles’ population.159 As previously mentioned, although New York City has a larger tenant 
population percentage, the percentage of apartments turned into Airbnb listings is five times 
greater in Tel Aviv-Yaffo than in New York City. Therefore, although Airbnb does increase 
rents by removing apartments from the residential market, the percentage of renters is not a 
strong argument for Airbnb’s impact on the city’s housing market.  
Israeli scholar Yaniv attributed Airbnb’s boom in Tel Aviv-Yaffo to a lack of regulations 
in the city’s tourism industry and real estate market.160 Operators of "traditional" 
accommodation, such as hotels and hostels, argue that, in most cases, those who rent out their 
properties for tourism purposes are not required to pay taxes to the authorities and meet the 
restrictive conditions set for them.161 Airbnb is considered a 'shared economy' platform, but in 
practice it allows for organized entrepreneurs, some of them large and established, to produce 
professional hotel units in the city centers without bearing the burden of investment, statutory 
procedure, planning and licensing, organization, and sometimes the taxation imposed on 
hoteliers.162 This inviting and deregulated business creates a natural shift of housing units from 
long-term accommodations to be used by hoteliers-entrepreneurs. As of June 2017, 4% of 
landlords in Tel Aviv-Yaffo have 5 or more properties for rent, with an average of 3.14 
 
158 Elster and Nesher, “הצעה לרגולציה מיטבית של Airbnb בתל אביב -יפו [Policy Solution for Airbnb Regulations in Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo]”, 2. 
159 “2013-2017 ACS 5-Year Estimates” (Washington, DC: United States Census Bureau, November 28, 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-documentation/table-and-geography-changes/2017/5-
year.html. 
160 Yaniv, “נכסים להשכרה לתיירים לטווח קצר בישראל ובעולם תמונת מצב ואפשרויות הסדרה [Properties for Short-Term Rent to 
Tourists in Israel and Around the World].” 
161 Yaniv, 17. 
162 Eric T. Schneiderman, “Airbnb in the City” (New York City, NY: New York State Office of the Attorney 




properties per landlord.163 Thus, these apartments operate as illegal apartment hotels and their 
owners avoid paying taxes and meeting basic conditions for operating a place to stay. The 
Tourism Ministry of Israel encourages this activity, although many other countries impose 
restrictions on these sorts of platforms. Tourism Ministry director-general Amir Halevi explains 
the ministry’s position:  
Our goal is to increase the supply of rooms. This year a record is going to be broken with 
more than 3.5 million tourists coming here. We need as many accommodations as 
possible. We will work toward this on all fronts, including converting office buildings 
into hotels.164  
 
In Israel, there is no regulation or restriction of Airbnb activity as both the Tel Aviv municipality 
and the Tourism Ministry encourage the capital inflow brought in by tourists.165 
While this explanation falls in line with Tel Aviv-Yaffo’s history of entrepreneurship and 
policy independence from the rest of the state, as previously mentioned, there are larger 
structural reasons for the lack of regulation in Tel Aviv-Yaffo. Tel Aviv-Yaffo’s urban policies 
are reflective of the fact that municipal finances are heavily dependent on the appropriation of 
ground rent, local planning practices are predominantly shaped by profit-maximizing 
considerations.166 Therefore, it would be more pertinent to examine the larger economic factors 
at play.  
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What Happens When Airbnb Enters the Market? 
The “Hotelization” of Rental Properties 
While Airbnb advertises itself as a way for tenants or homeowners to supplement their 
income, Table 2 demonstrates that most Airbnbs in Tel Aviv-Yaffo are run by hosts with 
multiple listings. Legal scholar Dayne Lee (2016) refers to this phenomenon as the  
“hotelization” of rental properties and it consists of two processes: first a private property 
(usually apartments) is converted into a rental tourist property, then entire buildings are 
converted into illegal hotels.167 In May of 2019, about 9,150 properties are listed on Airbnb, of 
which about 7,500 (82%) apartments and 1,500 rooms are shared over 5,040 active hosts.168 
There is a distinction between 'casual' assets belonging to tenants for a limited period of time or 
an apartment as an income supplement, and "professional" properties belonging to tenants or 
apartments regularly, thus removing the same property from the residential market. By the end of 
2017, 12 Airbnb hosts owned 970 properties, and 75 hosts own about 2,150 properties or a 
quarter of all Airbnb properties in the city.169 It is the professional assets that are at the center of 
my attention because they cause the bulk of the damage to the rental market. 
Of all the properties offered for rent in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, about 4,150 are registered as 
having only one property for their hosts (Single-Listings Hosts). The other assets, about 5,000 in 
number (55% of all assets leased on Airbnb), are leased by 870 professional landlords (Multi-
Listing Hosts). Thus, at least 5,000 apartments are no longer used for residence and do not 
constitute a means of supplementing the occasional income for the tenants of the apartments but 
are rented as a hotel entrepreneurial business for all intents and purposes. Beyond that, there is a 
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high probability that even out of the 4,150 properties rented by a landlord whose only property is 
there, there are professional assets. According to the municipality itself, there are about 7,150 
apartments used as a hotel business.170  
Incentives for Airbnb to Professionalize Landlords 
Airbnb relies on guest ratings and the Super Host status. A tourist seeking to rent a room 
or an apartment on the site will usually look through the guest reviews to decide whether to stay 
at that listing. An apartment with a high rating from many visitors will significantly increase the 
chance of renting the apartment. A ‘casual’ landlord will not get a high number of reviews on the 
site, so tourists will feel that they are taking a risk. Moreover, hosts who have “completed at least 
10 stays in the past year or 100 nights over at least 3 completed stays”, maintain a 4.8+ overall 
rating from their guests, cancel less than 1% of the time, and respond to 90% of new messages 
within 24 hours are awarded Superhost status.171  
Airbnb has built its business model on commission that is passed on to Airbnb from each 
transaction and is calculated as a percentage of the price. For this reason, Airbnb encourages 
hosts to carry out multiple transactions at high listing prices. Therefore, casual renting would be 
contrary to the marketing logic of Airbnb. 
Beyond that, professional landlords (who, as mentioned, are the majority of landlords in 
Tel Aviv-Yafo) make it easier to carry out the transaction on additional levels. For instance, 
professional landlords allow the consumer to book the apartment or room without 
correspondence with them using Instant Booking.172 This is very convenient from the 
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consumer’s point of view, who then do not have to correspond with the landlord, introduce 
themselves to the landlord, wait for a booking confirmation, and so on - things that are required 
by the casual landlord. Professional landlords take the risk involved in hosting bad tenants or 
new Airbnb users, thus making the ordering process easier. 
Naturally, the percentage of transactions made by professional landlords is much higher, 
since by definition, 'casual' landlords rent out their apartment from time to time, and 
'professional' landlords strive to rent out the intended property to hotels as much as possible. 
However, Airbnb incentivizes professional landlords through their Superhost program in which 
these users receive more visibility, a significant increase in earnings, and a bonus for referring 
new hosts.173 Elster and Nesher estimate that Airbnb entrepreneurs (multi-listing hosts) in Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo make higher earnings on average by 40% to 130% compared to single-listing hosts 
that are using Airbnb to supplement their income.174 As a result, the vast majority of rental nights 
on Airbnb are in units that have been converted to hotels, and not in apartments where the 
Airbnb platform is a means of supplementing income.175 
Creates Scarcity 
As demonstrated by Table 2, Airbnb has converted more residential units in Tel Aviv-
Yaffo than in any other major city in the world.176 Airbnb has made it simpler and more 
profitable for landlords and property managers to offer units as year-round short-term rentals 
than as long-term residential rentals. Therefore, the demand for these short-term rentals is 
placing upward pressure on rents.177  
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Wachsmuth and Weisler describe this phenomenon through the rent gap model, a 
situation where the actual economic returns to properties tend to decline or stagnate while 
potential economic returns tend to increase (see fig. 2).178  
 




In neighbourhoods where this “gap” between actual and potential returns systematically 
increases, the result will be a corresponding increasing incentive for real estate capital to direct 
new housing investment flows.179 As these investment flows drive up housing prices, attract 
more affluent newcomers, and displace existing poorer residents, the result is gentrification. 
There are two other immediate implications of the short-term nature of Airbnb’s rent gaps: either 
in the short-term with actual evictions to make room for more profitable tenants or over a slightly 
longer timescale as long-term rental housing is “organically” converted to short-term rentals, the 
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result will be the displacement of an existing, lower-income population and the arrival of higher-
income newcomers.180 
Airbnb is presented as an inexpensive alternative, but figures show that the hotels and the 
short-term rental platforms coexist just fine in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, and both are flourishing; 
therefore, it is really the long-term renters paying the price. According to the Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
Municipality, between 2013 to 2016, rental prices in the city rose by nine percent (9%) and the 
prices of apartments sold rose by 27.5 percent.181 Kerner’s study further demonstrates that 
Airbnb is responsible for the steep rise in Tel Aviv-Yaffo rents for the past 10 years, primarily in 
the market for one to two-room apartments as they are the most popular type of properties on 
these websites.182 Beyond that, from 2017 to 2019, average rent in Tel Aviv-Yaffo has increased 
from NIS 5,517.90 to NIS 5,792.70 (see Table 1).183 In comparison, in 2019, rent in Tel Aviv-
Yaffo had gone up by almost twice  as much (3.3%) as it did in Toronto (1.8%).184 To put it 
further in perspective, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the average monthly 
income in December 2019 was reported to be NIS 8,817, which means rent expenses 65% of a 
resident’s monthly income.185  
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The gentrification process escalates when local businesses that would create ties with 
residents are instead replaced by businesses that only focus on tourists. Tourists often pay much 
more for coffee or groceries than local residents, so businesses with higher prices enter the 
market. If local residents can no longer afford to shop at the over-priced stores in their area, they 
are forced to move to a new area. Thus, Wachsmuth & Weisler have noted that Airbnb raises 
potential landlord income without any need for redevelopment, in a geographically uneven way, 
by concentrating on neighbourhoods with a “local” tourist appeal that does not necessarily 
overlap with areas that were gentrified due to more conventional market factors.186 With 4.5 
million tourists coming to Tel Aviv-Yaffo in 2019 alone, some of the gentrification that occurs in 
the city can justifiably qualify as “transnational gentrification”.187 Airbnb pushes up the cost of 
rent which greases the wheels of gentrification and accelerates the decline of marginalized 
neighbourhoods.  
Displacing Marginalized Residents, Transforming Neighbourhoods 
As with developments in most other global cities, the restructuring of Tel Aviv-Yaffo has 
led to a rise in social inequality tied to labour-market polarization, with greater demand both for 
highly qualified and for low-income workers.188 This polarization is reflected in a strong socio-
spatial division between the affluent northern parts of the city, inhabited mostly by the 
Ashkenazi upper and middle classes, and the ‘hard-up’, neglected, southern and southeastern 
neighbourhoods populated mostly by Jewish Mizrahi lower classes, Arab-Palestinians in Jaffa, 
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labour migrants, and African refugees concentrated in the areas around the Central Bus Station 
where rental prices used to be relatively low (see fig. 3).189 
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In terms of Airbnb's entry into the various neighbourhoods in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, it appears 
that not all neighbourhoods have a large presence of properties rented through the site. 
Neighbourhoods far from the historic center, such as Ne'ot Afeka ( אפקה  נאות ), Ramat HaTayasim 
( הטייסים רמת ), Neve Barbur ( בארבור נווה ), and Kfar Shalem ( שלם כפר ) have little to no Airbnb 
listings.190 However, in a significant number of neighbourhoods, a high number of Airbnb 
activity was recorded relative to the total number of dwelling units. Most of the Airbnb activity 
in Tel Aviv-Yafo is concentrated in the city center and south of it, with most of the apartments 
and rooms located on Ibon Gabirol Street with a leakage of property concentrations in Florentin 
and Jaffa.191 To demonstrate the impact of Airbnb on marginalized neighbourhoods in Tel Aviv-
Yaffo, Table 3 ranks the top 10 neighbourhoods impacted by the percentage of residential units 
that have been converted to Airbnbs.  
Table 3: Tel Aviv-Yaffo Neighbourhoods with Highest Number of Dwelling Units Lost to Airbnb (2017)  
 





1 Kerem Hatemanim ( התימנים כרם ) 657 3,111 21.1% 
2 Neve Tzedek ( צדק  נווה ) 322 2,452 13.1% 
3 North Jaffa ( יפו צפון ) 389 3,464 11.2% 
4 Old Jaffa/Jaffa Port ( יפו נמל ,יפו צפון ) 41 434 9.4% 
5 Orot (9.0% 67 6 (אורות 
6 Lev Ha’ir ( העיר לב ) 1,479 18,060 8.2% 
7 South HaTzafon HaYashan ( הישן  הצפון ) 1,339 17,171 7.8% 
8 Sarona ( שרונה גני ) 72 1,064 6.8% 
9 North HaTzafon HaYashan ( הישן  הצפון ) 1,266 18,968 6.7% 
10 Florentin (4.8% 6,038 291 (פלורנטין 
Source: אביביפו תל  ,הדיור יחידות כלל מתו  מרובות דירות של ביותר הגבוה השיעור בעלות השכונות ר עשר: 4 טבלה   
[Table 4: The ten neighbourhoods with the highest rate of residential units lost to Airbnb, Tel Aviv] 
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As previously mentioned, these are marginalized neighbourhoods that have historically been 
populated by Palestinian Arabs, Yemenite Jews, and Mizrahi Jews. By the end of 2017, more 
than 21% of the apartments in Kerem HaTeimanim (a Yemeni neighbourhood), more than 13% 
of the apartments in Neve Tzedek (a Mizrahim and Yemeni neighbourhood), and more than 11% 
of the apartments in North Jaffa (an Arabic neighbourhood) have been converted into Airbnb 
hotels.193 These neighbourhoods in particular have been neglected by the Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
Municipality to deteriorate, placing the onus of renovations on the residents, and forcing 
residents out when they can no longer afford the necessary improvements.194 These deteriorating 
conditions create the conditions for Airbnb entrepreneurs to buy the properties at a low cost and 
rent them out to tourists. Thus, Airbnb has introduced a new potential revenue flow in the 
housing markets based around tourists, which is geographically uneven. As a result, these 
marginalized neighbourhoods become seen as culturally desirable and internationally 
recognizable, which has subjected them to extensive gentrification. 
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CHAPTER V: AIRBNB IN THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS 
Tel Aviv-Yaffo to West Bank Migration 
The question now is: where have those displaced residents gone? According to the Tel 
Aviv Municipality Statistics, a growing number of those displaced citizens have moved to the 
West Bank.195 See Table 4 for more detail. More importantly, the increased rent prices in Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo and lack of affordable housing options, an increasing number of poor Jewish Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo residents are moving into West Bank settlements. 
Table 4: Departure from Tel Aviv-Yaffo to the West Bank 
Zones in Tel Aviv-Yaffo 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
South (189 167 165 209 210 (דרום 
Center (32 39 39 68 60 (מרכז 
North (60 105 92 103 140 (צפון 
Trans-Yarkon (39 51 37 59 60 (עבר הירקון 
Total 460 439 333 362 323 
Percentage from South of Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
to the West Bank 
46% 48% 50% 46% 59% 
Source: “ מוצא ואזור יעד יישוב לפי ,אחרים ליישובים יפו-א"מת יוצאים  [Leaving T.A.-Yafo to Other Locality and 
Zone of Origin 2014 to 2018 - Table 3.47],” Population Report (Tel Aviv, Israel: Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
Municipality, 2020). 
 
While the total number of Tel Aviv-Yaffo citizens moving into the West Bank has decreased 
between 2014 to 2018, the percentage of Tel Aviv-Yaffo residents from the south has increased 
by 13%. The majority (59%) of Tel Aviv-Yaffo citizens moving to the West Bank are from the 
south Yaffo – the part of the city with mostly marginalized neighbourhoods that have been 
displaced by Airbnb as mentioned in the previous chapter. From 2016 to 2018, the number of 
southern residents moving to the West Bank annually increased by 22 citizens. These could very 
well be the displaced citizens from the many marginalized neighbourhoods impacted by Airbnb; 
however, it must be stated that this is most likely an underestimate as the Tel Aviv Municipality 
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gathers this information tracking permanent address changes and many young people prefer to 
keep their permanent address as their parent’s homes.196 A 2020 report shows that the Jewish 
population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is growing at a faster rate than the population 
within the Green Line.197 This can partially be attributed to Netanyahu’s campaign to bring more 
Jewish Israeli citizens to live in the West Bank settlements by providing numerous subsidies and 
benefit. Airbnb has aided in this push by providing short-term accommodations in the 
settlements, allowing more people to visit them.  
The Tourism Industry of the Settlements 
In part with that the state funding that goes to the West Bank settlement economy, Israel 
has recently increased funding to the tourism industry linked to settlements.198 In 2010, the state 
of Israel allocated approximately NIS 367 million for the development and military protection of 
historic sites “that reflect the national heritage of the Jewish people” across Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory.199 This includes 13 historic sites in East Jerusalem and 30 sites in 
the West Bank.200  
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In June 2016, the government announced an additional programme of “special financial 
aid”, with provisions to support the development of the tourism industry in West Bank 
settlements.201 This resulted in a grant of NIS 5 million for “public tourism infrastructure”.202 In 
this programme, Netanyahu announced subsidies will be given to the “establishment, conversion 
and expansion” of all short-term accommodations (i.e. Airbnbs, hotels, and B&Bs) in West Bank 
settlements.203 
 While there are no government figures for West Bank visitors or whether these subsidies 
have gone towards Airbnbs, the Yesha Council, an umbrella organization of Jewish settlement 
municipal councils in the West Bank, announced that in 2018 during Passover, approximately 
300,000 tourists visited their various “tourist sites, routes, museums, festivals, wineries and 
archaeological sites.”204 There are many of these scattered across the West Bank. A recent 
guidebook listed more than 200 places to visit, stay or eat in settlements.205 Tourists visiting 
these attractions and spending money in the restaurants and other sites directly contribute to the 
maintenance and growth of settlements, since businesses are owned or managed by settlers. 
Israel’s support for tourism infrastructure has also come at the cost of Palestine’s own 
tourism industry, which has faced numerous physical, institutional, and financial restrictions 
imposed by Israel since 1967.206 In spite of the essential part that Christian and Muslim 
pilgrimages have played in the tourism industry in Palestine, not only does the money earned in 
Palestine finds its way into the Israeli economy but Israel’s tourism industry in Palestine has 
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dominated the territory.207 In addition to these financial gains, the Israeli government has a larger 
Zionist goal for developing a booming tourism industry in the West Bank. Tourism serves two 
functions: emphasizes the Jewish people’s historic connection to the land and allows Israeli 
settlers to provide an explanation centred on their experiences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
When Trump took office, spokesperson of Hebron settlers released a statement explaining, “from 
our perspective, living here is key to giving the modern state of Israel its rooting in Jewish 
history.”208  
For this reason, Israel has constructed many of its settlements near archaeological and 
other historic sites; it is in order to for them to be able to make the connection between Jewish 
history and the land explicit.209 Similar to the Allon Plan and the settlement-building logic of the 
1970s, archaeological sites legitimize Israel’s increasing military presence in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.210  Simultaneously, Israel’s tourism is able to downplay or completely 
neglect non-Jewish historic periods at these sites.211 These acts of rewriting history minimize the 
Palestinian’s historic connection to the land.  
Websites and tour maps issued by Israel’s Ministry of Tourism and Israel Nature and 
Park Authority do not show the Green Line. Rather, these maps deliberately conceal and mark 
the West Bank as “Judea and Samaria”, a term used by the Israeli government and settlers, but 
not by Palestinians.212 In addition, the designation of certain locations as tourists is used by the 
Israeli state to remove Palestinians from their land and their homes. For instance, nature reserves 
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in the West Bank are protected by Israeli military order, which penalizes Palestinians for 
attempting to graze their animals, using the land for agricultural purposes, and establishing or 
expanding their homes or agricultural structures.213 Palestinians have been evicted from their 
homes and prevented from entering their land when a new archaeological site was declared as 
falling within the jurisdiction of settler regional councils.214 
Settlements as Airbnb Listings 
In 2019, more foreign visitors visited the Occupied Palestinian Territories (76.5%), than 
they had the Dead Sea region (74.2%).215 Many of these tourists are increasingly using the 
internet to research destinations and book their vacations. As of 2018, the majority of tourists 
book their accommodations online.216 The intersection of these trends has brought tourists to 
booking Airbnbs in West Bank settlements – knowingly or unknowingly.  
Airbnb has received a lot of criticisms for giving platform and business opportunities to 
Jewish citizens living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In 2018, Airbnb succumbed to 
public pressures and removed listings of rentals in illegal settlements in the West Bank – only to 
reverse this decision a year later.217 While Airbnb is a platform open to both Palestinians and 
Jewish settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the ways in which Jewish settlers 
use it turns illegal settlements into tourist attractions.  
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The Israeli settlements are part of a decades-old military occupation that has confiscated 
42 percent of Palestinian land in the West Bank for settlement construction, resulting in the loss 
of freedom of movement and other human rights abuses against the Palestinian people.218 For 
years, Airbnb has profited from rental suites built on top of the ruins of Palestinian lives and 
livelihoods with no mention on these postings that they are on militarily occupied land. In turn, it 
has directly helped Israeli settlers legitimize their occupation, contributing to the Israeli 
government’s decades-long policies of occupation, discrimination, and dispossession. The 
normalization of an exclusive and militarized ethnic enclave as a tourist destination serves as an 
example of the way in which Airbnb fits into the matrix of colonialism in the region. Moreover, 
Airbnb is also still operating in other Occupied Palestinian Territories, such as East Jerusalem 
and Golan Heights.  
Airbnb also does not require hosts to provide their guest with the property address of the 
listing until after they have made the booking.219 Prior to the booking, Airbnb guests can only go 
by the information that hosts choose to display. As a result, most West Bank settler-run Airbnb 
choose to falsely state that the property is located in Israel, rather than the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (see fig. 4 and fig. 5). 
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For example, a house in the settlement of Har Adar ( ֲאָדר ַהר ) was listed by its owners as being in 
“Har Adar, Israel” (see fig. 4).220 Similarly, the owner of an house in the settlement of Giv'at 
Ze'ev in the West Bank misleadingly states that it is in Israel (see fig. 5).221 
This illustrates the ways in which Netanyahu’s regime has deliberately used neoliberal 
governmentality to distribute the risks of dwelling-based accumulation by dispossession to 
individuals within the Green Line. The displacement of southern Tel Aviv-Yaffo citizens can 
become part of the violence enacted against Palestinians as these Israeli residents in search of 
affordable housing move on to Palestinian land and displace them. As neoliberal violence within 
Israel increases, so – at least theoretically – would the incentive to offset neoliberal violence with 
political violence, thereby contributing to the national struggle over the homeland via settlement. 
The settlement project’s dependence on mass settlement and deepening international pressure to 
reach a two-state solution required a substantial push to draw citizens to the West Bank. Airbnb 
even if indirectly is part of the process that aids the state of Israel in steering capital flows 
towards West Bank settlements both via tourism and the gentrification-colonization process.  
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CHAPTER VI: CONLCUSION 
In March 2020, tourism and much of the leisure industry were brought to a halt in nearly 
every country around the world.222 The COVID-19 Pandemic has changed the structure of our 
everyday lives and the global impact of world events; therefore, I return to my research question 
with a pre-COVID and post-COVID considerations. My master’s research asked the following 
question: what role does Airbnb play in Tel Aviv-Yaffo’s housing crisis and the West Bank 
settlement economy? 
 Existing Israeli scholarship has proposed a number of compelling answers for this 
question, from policy solutions to examining the economic factors, yet the works failed to 
understand the gentrification process with the Israel-Palestine matrix of gentrification and 
colonization. To put it simply, Airbnb has accelerated the transnational gentrification process 
that has been occurring in Tel Aviv-Yaffo with the coming of the neoliberal era and the Israeli 
state-funded tourism in West Bank settlements through the introduction of new capital flows. 
 The State of Israel has used housing as one mechanism by which it designed the nation to 
serve Zionist aims. Racial segregation emerged through public housing policies and provisions, 
which resulted in stark socio-economic divisions between Ashkenazi, Mizrahi and Palestinian 
communities still seen evidence of in Tel Aviv-Yaffo today. This was illustrated by the differing 
demands in the 2011 Housing Protests in Tel Aviv-Yaffo as Ashkenazim activists demanded 
cost-of-living subsidies, while Mizrahim demanded repairs to their deteriorating 
neighbourhoods. While these protests occurred across the nation, they were heightened in Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo as the city’s finances are heavily dependent on the appropriation of ground rent, 
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which resulted in local planning practices that are predominantly shaped by profit-maximizing 
considerations that direct most planning activities towards the luxury market.223 
 While the Housing Protests came to an end in October 2011, rent and housing prices have 
only increased since, and Airbnb has played its part in exacerbate existing neoliberal planning 
practices in Tel Aviv-Yaffo.224 Airbnb converted more Tel Aviv apartments and apartment 
complexes into hotels than in any other major city in the world.225 Existing Israeli literature 
accredits this to a lack of regulations in the city’s tourism industry and real estate market and the 
majority of the city being made of tenants, but this does not address the larger trends in Tel 
Aviv-Yaffo that enabled this – transnational gentrification and the historic marginalization of 
Palestinian and Mizrahi neighbourhoods.226  
Airbnb has created a “hotelization” phenomenon in the rental market, in which the 
majority of Airbnbs on the market are run by Airbnb entrepreneurs (multi-listings hosts) – some 
even renting out apartment complexes. Airbnb benefits from having professional landlords as 
their business commission model (in which Airbnb receives a higher commission from multiple 
and high-price listings), and Instant Booking feature. Airbnb also prioritizes their multi-listing 
hosts through their “Superhost program” in which they give these hosts more visibility, higher 
earnings, and bonuses for referring new hosts.227 This results in the conversion of residential 
properties into commercial properties which creates housing scarcity. Evidently, Airbnb is not 
being used to supplement incomes in Tel Aviv-Yaffo, but rather a means of converting the low 
supply of residential units into illegal hotels en mass. As residential unit supply does down and 
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demands for short-term rentals goes up, this places upward pressure on rent prices. Then, the 
“gap” between actual and potential returns increases which creates an increasing incentive for 
real estate capital to direct new investment flows (see fig. 3), which attracts affluent newcomers 
into the neighbourhood. Local businesses that would create ties with residents are then replaced 
with businesses that target the tourist market. Since tourists are willing to pay much more for a 
cup of coffee and groceries than residents, businesses in the area increase prices to meet their 
new market. In particular, Airbnb presents itself as the affordable option for short-term 
accommodations, so many of the Airbnb listings are in neighbourhoods with cheaper rent; thus, 
Airbnb disproportionally affects marginalized neighbourhoods in south Tel Aviv-Yaffo 
populated with mostly Mizrahi Jews, Yemenite Jews, and Palestinian Arabs.  
In the West Bank 
 In the 1980s, as the welfare state shrank within the Green Lines, funding and benefits 
grew for West Bank settlements.228  While the Israeli state was involved in supporting the 
settlements from the very beginning, by providing military security and other basic means, the 
neoliberal era created new incentives for the Israeli governments to dedicate substantial financial 
support for the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. These incentives were as considerable as 
they were diverse: Israeli government-subsidized building costs, cheap land, government-
subsidized mortgages, suburban environment, and approximately 93,000 NIS in annual payments 
from the State of Israel.229 In this same period, increasing numbers of Tel Aviv-Yaffo residents 
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from displaced and marginalized neighbourhoods have begun moving into West Bank 
settlements.230   
Moreover, the State of Israel has dramatically increased its funding for tourism in the 
West Bank settlements over recent years. As a result, in 2019, more foreign visitors have visited 
the West Bank than they had the Dead Sea region.231 More importantly, Netanyahu announced 
subsidies will be given to the “establishment, conversion and expansion” of all short-term 
accommodations, including Airbnbs, in West Bank settlements.232 These developments have 
resulted in more tourists booking Airbnbs in West Bank settlements than ever – knowingly or 
unknowingly. Israel’s tourism industry and Airbnb in the West bank deliberately conceal their 
location or falsely state their settlement location as “Israel” rather than the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. Whether by subsidizing tourism or housing, all such practices by the Israeli 
government and Airbnb work to normalize the occupation. However, as the tourism industry 
around the world has come to a pause due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Tel Aviv-Yaffo’s and the 
West Bank’s future seem uncertain.  
Post-Pandemic Considerations 
Just as the repercussions of the 2008 financial crisis altered real estate markets globally 
with significant long-term effects on housing and urban neighbourhoods, the COVID-19 
pandemic will now also significantly impact the future of Tel Aviv-Yaffo.233 While the post-
pandemic future of Airbnb looks uncertain, the bulk of the loss is certainly felt by Airbnb hosts 
as the Airbnb model transfers risk through outsourcing room services to Airbnb hosts. According 
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to one hospitality study, Airbnb hosts have lost eight times more income than they have pre-
pandemic.234 The only reason hosts’ incomes have not dropped to zero is the increasing use of 
Airbnb’s as quarantine hotels.235 From the data mentioned in previous sections, I predict the 
income loss will largely impact the minority of hosts who use this to supplement their income 
(Single-Listing hosts), but also the Airbnb entrepreneurs (Multi-listing hosts).  
 According to David Harvey, the 2008 financial crisis led to state policies that emphasized 
a further shift to urban consumerism by promoting infrastructural investments in airports and 
airlines, hospitality, leisure-based activities and related industries that promote an increase in 
capital turnover.236 From the 1990s and onwards, urban consumerism and urban 
entrepreneurialism became exacerbated trends in the context of tourism-driven transnational 
gentrification.237 
However, political theorists Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson have argued that 
platform economics (i.e. Airbnb, Uber) have been much more influential to transnational 
gentrification than the rise of the tourism industry and urban entrepreneurialism.238 Critical 
geographers Georgia Alexandri and Michael Janoschka explain:  
Platform capitalism has permitted a spectacular acceleration of real estate extractivism, 
including the transformation of local housing stock in inner-city neighbourhoods to short-
term rentals. On the other hand, the temporality and intensiveness of gentrification also 
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rely on the state’s capacity to impose its own rhythm on the production of and social 
reproduction in space.239 
 
Thus, tourism and transnational gentrification develop following state interventions aiming to 
expedite markets for transient and highly mobile people.240 The need for rapid capital turnovers 
explains why the recreation of space focuses mainly on “the outsider, the investor, the developer, 
businesswoman or -man, or the money-packed tourist.”241 In this regard, in the aftermath of the 
COVID-19 crisis, Georgia Alexandri and Michael Janoschka expect new coalitions between 
states and capital to emerge so as “to restructure the urban voids left behind by the breakdown of 
the pre-2020 accumulation model based on tourism and consumption.”242 In this respect, it is 
important to consider that international travel reached record numbers in 2019, and further 
growth was expected.243 The tourism industry and transnational gentrification may stagnate, but 
likely return alongside social movements organizing substantial anti-tourism protests.  
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